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Abstract
Since 2013 China has introduced increasingly stringent restrictions on imports of
recyclables, and those restrictions have severely limited the amount of recyclables allowed into the
country. Because China plays such a large role in handling global recycling flows—including
waste from the U.S.—these restrictions are likely to have enormous impacts on trade in
recyclables over the long term. The restrictions are potentially vulnerable to challenge within the
World Trade Organization (WTO), but challenging the restrictions could create many negative
impacts and be seen as an action akin to U.S. imperialism by denying China a right to a healthy
environment. The domestic Chinese recyclables trade, however, has seen a great deal of economic
benefit already from these restrictions—so it seems difficult to argue that any Chinese restrictions
are purely motivated by a desire for a better environment. Additionally, the ongoing trade war
between the U.S. and China could complicate any attempt to bring a suit. Although it is likely
that the U.S. would be able to win a WTO dispute challenging the Chinese restrictions, the costs
of filing a suit outweigh the benefits and the U.S. should not challenge the restrictions.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
As opportunities for recycling diverse materials increase and natural
resources become scarcer, the global recycling trade continues to grow and
diversify. Throughout the 2010s, China introduced multiple restrictions on
importing recyclable materials, steadily increasing the restrictions and limiting the
influx of recyclables into the country. 1 China’s initial restrictions were largely
focused on preventing smuggling and imposing minor contamination limits (limits
on the amount of non-recyclable material that is accidentally included in a
shipment of recyclable material). 2 China’s most recent restrictions, however,
include outright bans on a variety of materials, as well as contamination limits so
low that recyclables processing plants may be unable to produce sufficiently clean
recyclables streams. 3
These restrictions pose a serious problem for the U.S. and the rest of the
international community because China processes an enormous share of the
recyclable material produced globally. 4 Usually, where one door closes, a window
will open. In this case, however, the windows have begun to close as well. Soon
after China’s more stringent restrictions were implemented, other nearby
countries began processing many of the recyclables that had been rejected at
Chinese ports. 5 But those countries seemingly could not handle either the
contamination in the shipments or the influx of recyclables generally, because they
have begun to introduce their own restrictions. 6 As a result, there is no readily
available place to send the U.S.’s recyclables, and the problem of dealing with
recyclables grows as more recyclables are produced.

1

From Green Fence to Red Alert: A China Timeline, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Sept. 25, 2018),
http://perma.cc/D6U6-YY5G.

2

Id.
Gwynn Guilford, China Doesn’t Want Your Trash Anymore—and That Could Spell Big Trouble for
American Cities, QUARTZ (May 8, 2013), http://perma.cc/F95G-9RAY; Colin Staub, China’s Slightly
Laxed Limit Does Little for Paper, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Dec. 5, 2017), http://perma.cc/CB887JD6.
Costas Velis, Global Recycling Markets: Plastic Waste, INTERNATIONAL SOLID WASTE ASSOCIATION
(Sept. 2014), http://perma.cc/KAK2-T88S.
Colin Staub, Where Exports Displaced from China are Finding a Home, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Jan. 16,
2018), http://perma.cc/AQ8M-S22R.
See, for example, Quang Minh, Gov’t Will No Longer Grant Licenses for Waste Imports, THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ONLINE NEWSPAPER OF THE GOVERNMENT (July 25, 2018),
http://perma.cc/L9GZ-PBBN.

3

4

5

6
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Recyclables are increasingly traded internationally and processed far from
where the recyclable materials are first collected. 7 Over time a trend has
established itself in which developed countries are increasingly sending their waste
to developing countries. 8 It is likely that this trend is partially motivated by cost
considerations, as it may be cheaper for developing countries to process the waste
than for developed countries to do so because of their different regulatory
frameworks regarding labor and environmental costs. 9 One study of recyclables
flows noted that “[u]nlike the relatively capital intensive and robustly regulated
recycling infrastructure of developed countries, the recycling infrastructure of
developing countries is labour intensive, largely in the informal sector, and often
with minimal environmental controls.” 10 The study found that over the 11-year
time frame during which it gathered data, flows of recyclable materials to “lowmiddle income” countries steadily replaced the flow of recyclables to “highincome” countries. 11 Less a product of policy than profit motivations, this trend
has resulted in concentrated recyclables flows towards China (among other
nations). 12
The U.S. lacks sufficient infrastructure to deal with the Chinese restrictions.
Many U.S. recycling facilities are unable to meet the very low contamination levels
that China has set, meaning they are unable to export their materials to China.
There are also insufficient facilities in the U.S. to process these recyclable materials
and create reusable products locally. Accordingly, many U.S. recycling facilities
have been forced to put their recyclables in landfills or simply hold onto the
materials until some new opportunity for export emerges. 13
The U.S.’s trade war with China further weakens the position from which
the U.S. could engage in diplomatic negotiations with China over shipments of
recyclables. The U.S. and China have both levied millions of dollars of tariffs on
goods and it is not apparent that either country is willing to back down. 14 This sets

7

See Donald Lyons, Murray Rice, & Robert Wachal, Circuits of Scrap: Closed Loop Industrial Ecosystems
and the Geography of US International Recyclable Material Flows 1995-2005, 175 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 286
(Dec. 2009).

8

Id. at 290.
Id. at 289.

9
10
11

12

Id.
Id. at 292. The study used the World Bank Income Groups, which categorize countries as high
income, high-middle income, low-middle income, and low income.
Id.

13

Amy L. Brooks, Shunli Wang, & Jenna R. Jambeck, The Chinese Import Ban and its Impact on Global
Plastic Waste Trade, SCI. ADVANCES, June 2018, at 4.

14

Brian Schwartz, Chinese Official Tells American Investors at a Meeting: We Don’t Fear a Trade War with the
U.S., CNBC (Oct. 22, 2018), http://perma.cc/78GC-6XP8.
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a tone decidedly antithetical to diplomatic discussions about how to deal with the
U.S.’s overwhelming backlog of recyclable materials.
Diplomatic negotiations aside, the U.S. may have another path to force
China’s hand in changing its recyclables restrictions: bring a suit in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body. Since China is a part of the
WTO, it is subject to the same restrictions facing all other WTO members. Among
the most important agreements to which China is a party is the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 15 The GATT requires countries to
(among other things) treat goods from other countries the same way that similar
domestic goods are treated, a principle termed “national treatment.” 16 The U.S.
could potentially file suit in the WTO and argue that China has failed to follow its
national treatment obligations by implementing these restrictions on imports of
recyclable materials into China while simultaneously not imposing the same
restrictions on local recyclables streams. 17
Under current WTO case law, China could potentially defeat this allegation
by arguing that its restrictions fall under the Article XX(b) exception to the
GATT, which protects restrictions that are “necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health.” 18 However, WTO case law makes it unlikely that China
would be able to meet the requirements for the XX(b) exception, making the U.S.
likely to succeed if it challenged the restrictions.
Even though the U.S. would likely succeed in a WTO suit, the costs of
winning seem to outweigh the benefits. The economic benefits are fairly
straightforward: depending on how the restrictions are revised, U.S. recyclables
processers would have a market for their materials, and profits and jobs would
return. There are also environmental benefits to consider: more processed
recyclables would mean less demand for energy and natural resources. 19 In terms
of costs, the potential suit will require resources and could damage the U.S.’s
relationship with China (which could have serious trade and diplomatic
ramifications), and China could possibly refuse to comply with a WTO order. 20
15

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1995, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]].

16

Chris Wold, A Primer on the WTO and the Global Trading System, LEWIS AND CLARK LAW SCHOOL:
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT (Nov. 2, 2000), http://perma.cc/V6Z4-TDEL.

17

World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Annex
1A: Information to be Provided by China in the Context of the Transitional Review Mechanism,
WTO DOC. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), at ¶ 1(a).
GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX(b).

18
19

Ben Mandler, Recycling as a Source of Mineral Commodities, AMERICAN GEOSCIENCES INSTITUTE (Mar.
2017), http://perma.cc/7GZM-QPE2.

20

See, for example, Report of the Panel, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler
Products from the United States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, 125–26, WTO Doc.
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Additionally, the U.S. could be seen as engaging in environmental imperialism by
forcing China to re-open its ports to harmful waste that it has specifically sought
to avoid in order to improve its environment. 21 Thus, although it is possible that
the U.S. would succeed if it filed suit in the WTO the U.S. should not file suit
because the many costs associated with the suit outweigh the potential benefits.
Section II of this Comment begins with a discussion of the restrictions China
has implemented, walking through the chronological iterations and asserted
justifications of these policies over time. It continues by examining the role that
China has played in the global recycling industry, and the recycling industry’s role
in the U.S. economy—highlighting the economic harms that the restrictions have
caused. The Section concludes with an analysis of China’s relationship with the
U.S. and its role in the WTO.
Section III starts with a discussion of China’s environmental problems and
the growth of Chinese environmental law over time. It then examines the
underlying international trade law to which China is subject.
Section IV first lays out the WTO case law’s position towards the
environmental exception under Article XX(b). Next, it analyzes the likely outcome
of a WTO suit filed by the U.S. asking China to revise its restrictions, applying
WTO case law to the facts of the dispute at issue. Ultimately, this Comment
demonstrates that although the U.S. could win a WTO dispute regarding China’s
recyclables restrictions, it should not challenge the restrictions through the WTO
because the potential costs associated with the challenge outweigh the benefits.
This Comment’s conclusion provides an overview of this multifaceted problem
and acknowledges the uncertain future for the global recycling trade and the U.S.
industries involved in that trade.

II. I NTRODUCTION TO THE R ESTRICTIONS AND W HY
T HEY M ATTER
China’s program of recyclables restrictions has gone through multiple
iterations and has become increasingly stringent over time. The restrictions were
first implemented through the 2013 Green Fence program. 22 Green Fence was
then followed by one very short-term program in 2015 and a long-term program

21

22

WT/DS427/RW (Jan. 18, 2018); Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, China – Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU
by the United States, WTO DOC. WT/DS427/14 (Mar. 1, 2018) (holding that the Chinese government
failed to come into compliance with an agreement it signed after it lost a WTO suit challenging its
restrictions on U.S. broiler chicken products).
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An Environmental Justice Critique of Free Trade, 78 DENV.
U. L. REV. 979, 979–80 (2001).
See Guilford, supra note 3.
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in 2017 called National Sword. 23 National Sword was superseded by Blue Sky in
2018. 24 Further restrictions have been announced to follow Blue Sky and are
expected to be implemented in 2019 and 2020. 25

A. Green Fence, 2013
China first introduced restrictions on recyclables in February 2013 with its
Green Fence program, which placed restrictions on imports of recyclable
materials that were considered contaminated. 26 The program implemented
inspections of shipments of sorted recyclable materials coming into the country. 27
It would not allow shipments to pass through customs to recycling facilities if
there were non-recyclable materials in the shipment, like trash in a shipment of
plastic bottles. 28 It also blocked shipments that were not the type of recyclable
materials described, such as a shipment of plastic bottles labeled as waste paper. 29
At the time, these restrictions were concerning for members of the international
recycling community because shipments of recyclables tend to have some amount
of contamination. Sorting facilities are efficient at removing contamination, but
are not perfect. 30 As a result, this inevitable contamination meant that Chinese
customs officers would potentially refuse recyclables shipments under the new
standards, while shipments would have been accepted under the previous
standards. For example, a shipment of plastic bottles that also happened to have
paper mixed in could have been accepted two days before the program began, but
would have been rejected once the new standards were in place. Recyclers in the
U.S. had particular reason to worry because the U.S. does not have the capacity to

23

Jared Paben, China Announces ‘Sword’ Crackdown on Illegal Recyclable Material Imports, RESOURCE
RECYCLING (Feb. 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/7UHN-CVDH. Steve Wong––Executive President
of the China Scrap Plastics Association––provided a translation of the text of the release to
Resource Recycling.

24

Steve Eminton, China’s Customs Authority Launches ‘Blue Sky 2018,’ LETSRECYCLE.COM (Mar. 7, 2018),
http://perma.cc/LE6F-HKYR.

25

Colin Staub, China Moves to Extend Ban to All Materials, RESOURCE RECYCLING (July 18, 2018),
http://perma.cc/F9AL-ZYV6.

26

Guilford, supra note 3.
Id.

27
28
29
30

Id.
Id.
There does not seem to be an industry-wide estimate of post-sorting contamination, but the fact
that 68,000 tons of recyclables were rejected under these new contamination standards indicates
the sorting is decidedly imperfect. See Gwynn Guilford, US States Banned from Exporting Their Trash
to China Are Drowning in Plastic, QUARTZ (Aug. 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/DN46-X58E.
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process recyclables domestically if many shipments were rejected. 31 That meant
there was no U.S. domestic market for the sorted materials, and the shippers
would potentially not be able to sell their materials to the Chinese customers who
had routinely bought their materials.
The program also limited the potential market for recyclables imports in
China even for those shipments of recyclables that were able to pass the
contamination requirements. Under the same program the Chinese government
eliminated hundreds of import licenses for Chinese recycling companies. 32
Without an import license, a company that processes recyclables cannot bring
recyclable material into the country from other nations. This meant that it was
then possible for a U.S. recyclables sorting facility to lose its purchasing partner in
China if the Chinese government chose to eliminate that Chinese corporation’s
import license.
The Green Fence program appeared to be motivated by serious concerns
about the issues of waste contamination that China faced then and continues to
face now. Among other environmental problems the country was confronting,
there were mountains of trash slowly accumulating across the country. 33
Additionally, while many of the materials being sent to China were labeled as
recyclable materials, instances of waste smuggling and mislabeling of materials as
recyclable were common, as were incredibly contaminated shipments of
recyclables. For instance, customs officials reported that they had seen
“recyclables” shipments filled with forty percent nonrecyclable materials and
shipments labeled as recycled rubber bands that were actually shipments of used
tires (which China had specifically banned). 34
In the first five months after Green Fence was implemented, 61,700 metric
tons of recyclables imports were rejected. 35 Although 61,700 is large, China
imported an estimated 8,009,674 metric tons of recyclable plastic in 2010, so the
proportion of rejected recyclables was not very large. 36 The implementation of the
program was celebrated in the South China Morning Post, which wrote that the
recycling industry had “added to the degradation of China’s environment” and
31

Jerry Powell, Plastics: The Big Picture, Presentation, RESOURCE RECYCLING, http://perma.cc/AZ2FHV9J (highlighting the fact that new recycling processing plants have been built seemingly
exclusively outside of the U.S. after 2003).

32

Gwynn Guilford, China’s Green Fence is Here to Stay: Why Your Water Bottle Won’t Be Recycled, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2013), http://perma.cc/T4CU-2AAS.

33

Gwynn Guilford, China’s Trash Troubles Are Piling up Fast – in Fact, They’re Forming Mountains, QUARTZ
(Mar. 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/52YD-BNBK.

34

China Recycling Clean-Up Jolts Global Industry, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://perma.cc/BJT8-N8LW.

35

Guilford, supra note 30.
Brooks, supra note 13, at Supp. 2018, http://perma.cc/3YQE-2MEP.

36
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that the Chinese government “wants to be seen as addressing increased public
awareness and concern over pollution.” 37 Despite its public relations success, the
Green Fence program was a temporary program with a planned end date of
November 2013. 38

1. China followed Green Fence with a short-term program in 2015.
In 2015, China implemented a two-month program aimed at verifying
whether recyclables imports were being processed correctly and preventing the
import of contaminated shipments. 39 The program was specifically focused on
plastic imports and was achieved through a directive to local authorities, rather
than as a larger campaign like the Green Fence program. 40 The program was
implemented in partnership with the anti-smuggling agency within the General
Administration of Customs, and it had two goals: preventing recyclables
smuggling and preventing resale of smuggled recyclables. 41 According to the
International Scrap Trade Database, China imported 7.3 million metric tons of
plastic scrap (about forty-eight percent of global plastic imports) and 29.2 million
metric tons of recovered fiber (over fifty percent of global fiber imports) in 2015. 42
Information about the program’s success is limited and annual figures
cannot speak well to the success of a program in place for only two months. On
one hand, the multiple iterations of later programs suggest that the program was
unsuccessful and that the government was forced to try again. On the other hand,
it could be read to say that the program was very successful and the government
wanted to further compound the success it achieved with this program.

B. National Sword, 2017
China first announced a multifaceted policy called National Sword on
February 7, 2017. The program was launched by the General Administration of
Customs and the press release stated that the recyclables side of the program
would specifically focus on trying to limit recyclables smuggling and illegal
recycling operations (carrying over the goals of previous iterations of the

37

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, supra note 34.

38

RESOURCE RECYCLING, supra note 1.
Two-Month Crackdown Relating to China’s Plastic Scrap Imports, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL RECYCLING
(Nov. 5, 2015), http://perma.cc/W76H-GJS9.
Bobby Elliott, China Again Cracks Down on Scrap Plastic Imports, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Nov. 11,
2015), http://perma.cc/4PBP-AZMR.
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL RECYCLING, supra note 39.

39

40

41
42

China Asks to Ban Mixed Paper and Many Plastic Scrap Grades, RECYCLING TODAY (July 19, 2017),
http://perma.cc/N4WT-FKPZ.
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recyclables restrictions). 43 Importantly, the program was to be part of a larger
program also targeting smuggling of other products, including drugs and guns. 44
The waste to be inspected included industrial, electronic, household, and plastic
waste. 45 A U.S.-based industry group, the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries,
Inc., reported that every container being exported to China was being inspected
when it arrived at port. 46 The Chinese press release also said that the General
Administration of Customs would work with China’s Ministry of Environmental
Protection in implementing the restrictions. 47
China later announced, via a July 18, 2017 filing with the WTO, that it would
ban the import of recovered mixed paper, as well as recycled polyethylene
terephthalate (PET) (plastic often used in bottles and other common recyclable
plastic items) 48 and other materials. 49 The ban was put in place after inspections
earlier in July 2017 found that two-thirds of the Chinese recycling companies
inspected by the Chinese government were violating Chinese environmental
regulations. 50 At the time, there was some confusion over whether these specific
investigations of the recycling companies were a part of National Sword or a part
of a separate program. 51 However, as time passed, National Sword became an
umbrella term to refer to all of the different recyclables restrictions China has put
in place. 52 Although its ban on recovered mixed paper covered all sectors, its
application to plastics was more limited—targeting postconsumer recyclable
plastics, rather than postindustrial recyclable plastics. 53 This targeted approach was
possibly motivated by “wishful recycling”—where uneducated consumers are
43
44

45
46
47

Paben, supra note 23.
National Sword 2017, INSTITUTE OF SCRAP RECYCLING INDUSTRIES, INC., http://perma.cc/D29C8D68.
Id.
Id.
Paben, supra note 23.

48

PET (Polyethylene Terephthalate, Resin Identification Code #1), THE ASSOCIATION OF PLASTIC RECYCLERS
(June 1, 2018), http://perma.cc/8B6L-89J3.

49

Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification: Catalogue of Solid Wastes Forbidden to Import
into China by the End of 2017, WTO DOC. G/TBT/N/CHN/1211 (July 18, 2017).

50

Colin Staub, China Says It Will Ban Certain Recovered Material Imports, RESOURCE RECYCLING (July 19,
2017), http://perma.cc/6PAZ-UPCM.

51

Colin Staub, New Inspections Further Slow Chinese Scrap Imports, RESOURCE RECYCLING (July 11, 2017),
http://perma.cc/8S98-TYTK.

52

A Chinese Ban on Rubbish Imports is Shaking up the Global Junk Trade, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2018),
http://perma.cc/YR9U-LYHU (referring to all of the Chinese restrictions as one program called
“National Sword”).
Action Plan to Phase out Waste Imports, THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(July 27, 2017), http://perma.cc/4F7S-DZV5. See also Colin Staub, China Offers Clues on What Will
(and Won’t) Be Allowed In, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Aug. 22, 2017), http://perma.cc/P3P7-UAUT.

53
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overinclusive rather than underinclusive as to the different classes of recyclables,
and add too many nonrecyclable materials to the recyclable materials. 54
On November 15, 2017, China submitted a series of Technical Barriers to
Trade Notifications 55 to the WTO regarding further recyclables import
restrictions. The notifications indicated that China would no longer accept
recyclables if the shipment had any more than 0.5 percent contamination. That
threshold was slightly more relaxed than the initially proposed limit of 0.3 percent
but still significantly lower than the previous standard of 1.5 percent. 56 This 0.5
percent contamination restriction was implemented beginning March 1, 2018. 57
Given the fact that many shipments of recyclables had already been rejected due
to the 1.5 percent contamination level previously in place, this 0.5 percent level is
a serious barrier to U.S. recyclables sorters hoping to send their materials to buyers
in China.

C. Blue Sky, 2018
On March 6, 2018, the Chinese government announced a program called
Blue Sky that would be run by the General Administration of Customs. 58 The
program was intended to run from March to December 2018 and appeared to be
aimed at enforcing the previously mentioned contamination limits by attempting
to further crack down on illegal smuggling of materials into China. This program,
however, was solely focused on recyclables and waste materials imports rather
than on smuggling generally. 59
On April 19, 2018, China made a further announcement banning additional
categories of waste. 60 The announcement listed one set of materials to be banned
by the end of 2018 and another to be banned by the end of 2019. 61 Most wastes
to be banned were not household recyclable wastes, but instead included notable
54

55

56

57
58
59
60

61

Livia Albeck-Ripka, 6 Things You’re Recycling Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018),
http://perma.cc/75KK-CP7A.
These are notifications that WTO members are required to submit to make other WTO members
aware of new regulations that may affect trade. Technical Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://perma.cc/TB76-HTFB.
Staub, supra note 3. See also Technical Barriers to Trade Information Management System, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://perma.cc/8XQF-JUZL (a collection of TBT Notifications on the WTO’s
website).
RESOURCE RECYCLING, supra note 1.
Eminton, supra note 24.
Id.
China, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Announcement on Adjustment to the Catalogue for the
Administration of Import Solid Waste (Apr. 19, 2018). English Translation by the Institute of Scrap
Recycling Industries available for reference: http://perma.cc/6K9K-66AZ.
Id.
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categories like industrial waste and scrap plastics. The ban would also apply to
metal and electric appliance scraps (both of which were banned by the end of
2018). 62 The Ministry of Ecology and Environment (an agency created in March
2018 to succeed a previous environmentally focused Ministry) spokesman, Liu
Youbin, stated that this restriction was a “key move to ensure environmental
safety and protect public health.” 63
On May 28, 2018, the General Administration of Customs announced
regulations scheduled to go into effect on June 1, 2018. 64 These regulations require
a licensed independent inspector to examine every load of recyclable material to
be exported to China, and to monitor the loading process. 65 Exporters at the time
expected serious shortages of inspectors and cost increases related to paying for
inspectors’ time. 66 However, the regulations are understandable from the Chinese
perspective—if recyclables sorters are sending out shipments that end up being
rejected by the customs officers in China, then it is possible that the ports will be
clogged with rejected recyclables shipments, which take up space without
contributing anything to the Chinese economy.
On July 11, 2018, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment released a
draft proposal for a program that would completely ban imports of recovered
fiber as well as all other forms of solid waste. Industry commentators had
speculated about this regulation, but the suggested timeline was reportedly shorter
than they expected. 67 The commentators had predicted that the regulations would
be implemented closer to 2020, but this draft indicated that the implementation
would potentially come sooner than industry speculation assumed. 68

62

Id.

63

UPDATE 1 – China Bans Imports of 16 More Scrap Waste Products from End – 2018 – Ministry, REUTERS
(Apr. 18, 2018), http://perma.cc/97BY-A8ZY.

64

Implementation of the regulations was delayed until June 22, 2018. See China, General Administration
of Customs, Announcement No. 48 in 2018 (Public Announcement on Promulgating the Implementation Rules on
the Supervision and Administration of Pre-shipping Inspection of Imported Solid Waste Used as Raw Materials)
(May 28, 2018). English translation by the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries available for
reference: http://perma.cc/K9AZ-FRQ5.
Id.
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Colin Staub, China Adds Another Hurdle for Exporters, RESOURCE RECYCLING (June 26, 2018),
http://perma.cc/8BT3-4VLX.
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Staub, supra note 25.
Id.
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D. Why the Restrictions Matter
1. China plays an enormous role in the global recycling process.
As previously stated, the recyclables trade has tended to gravitate towards
shipping materials internationally rather than processing materials within their
nation of origin. China plays an outsized role in handling the international flow of
recyclables. It handled fifty-seven percent of the total amount of plastic waste
imported globally in 2014. 69 This might be explained by the Chinese regulatory
framework and existing trade flows. China has lower labor and regulatory costs
than many other nations. Donald Lyons, professor of geography at University
College Cork and Associate Editor for Industrial Symbiosis for the Journal of
Industrial Ecology, states: “[t]o be economically viable, lower quality scrap needs
to be manually sorted before it is ready to be recycled and this is only possible in
low-income countries like China that have both a demand for scrap and an
abundant supply of cheap labour (and lax environmental laws) to manually sort
the scrap before reprocessing or re-refining it.” 70 Additionally, China’s large role
in international trade means that existing shipping routes can be exploited to send
waste cheaply from the U.S. to China. Lyons states:
[I]t is generally cheaper to transport scrap from Los Angeles across the Pacific
ocean rather than ship it overland to a mill in Pennsylvania or Virginia –
particularly now that recent advances in loading and crushing technology
allow scrap to be safely and cheaply loaded onto the empty container vessels
returning to China, having unloaded their cargo for American markets. 71

These low costs have led to enormous U.S. dependence upon Chinese
processing of waste. A report by the U.S. Trade Representative on China’s
compliance with its accession agreement noted that the value of the goods
exported by the U.S. to China that are prohibited under China’s outright ban on
certain materials was $479 million in 2016. 72

2. Other countries are no longer accepting displaced exports.
Many countries initially responded to the Chinese recyclables import
restrictions by shipping recyclables elsewhere in the world. Again, the trend
shifted towards shipping recyclable materials to developing rather than developed
nations. For example, India’s imports of PE (polyethylene plastic) grew to 88,155

69

Velis, supra note 4.

70

Lyons, supra note 7, at 296.
Id. (citing Justin Fox, 21st-Century Scrap, FORTUNE (May 15, 2006), http://perma.cc/A3TW-WNS7).
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72

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 REPORT
COMPLIANCE 69 (2018), http://perma.cc/2P5D-6CAS.
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metric tons in 2017 from 58,747 metric tons in 2016. 73 Other countries had even
more drastic increases in imports—more than doubling the amount of PE coming
through their ports. Vietnamese PE imports increased from 16,845 metric tons to
44,716 metric tons from 2016 to 2017. 74 Similarly, Malaysian PE imports grew
from 16,277 to 37,778 metric tons; Taiwanese PE imports grew from 14,063 to
16,575 metric tons; and Thai PE imports grew from 1,041 to 10,153 metric tons
(increasing over ten times!). 75
However, after being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of imports and the
associated environmental costs, these countries have begun to implement their
own recyclables import restrictions. The Malaysian government stopped issuing
scrap plastic import permits on July 23, 2018. 76 Following close on Malaysia’s
heels, the Vietnamese government announced that it would no longer grant new
licenses for waste material imports on July 25, 2018. 77 Subsequently, a group of
Thai regulatory agencies adopted a resolution on August 15, 2018 that would ban
the import of all electronic and plastic wastes (granting limited exceptions) within
the following two years. 78 On August 13, 2018, the Taiwanese Environmental
Protection Agency held a press conference and drafted regulations to restrict the
import of waste plastics and papers in the future. 79 As a result, it is not immediately
clear where these restricted recyclable material shipments can go. Further, it
remains unclear whether the trend of nations accepting recyclables shipments and
subsequently implementing aggressive restrictions limiting the flow of recyclables
will continue.

3. U.S. companies involved in the recycling industry are being harmed.
Given their rapid implementation, the recycling restrictions imposed by
China (and subsequent restrictions by other countries) have quickly had a large
impact on the global recycling trade, including large effects on U.S. companies
involved in the recyclables supply chain. While the first three quarters of 2017
were economically very successful for U.S. waste/recycling haulers, revenues
dropped significantly in the last quarter of 2017—likely as a result of the further
73
74
75
76

77

Staub, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Colin Staub, Container Backlogs Cause More Import Strife in SE Asia, RESOURCE RECYCLING (July 31,
2018), http://perma.cc/67SJ-FZJF.
Id. See also Quang Minh, supra note 6.

78

Pratch Rujivanarom, Government to Ban Import of Electronic, Plastic Wastes, THE NATION (Aug. 16,
2018), http://perma.cc/QJX8-PW3V.

79

Colin Staub, Markets Update: More Domestic Talk as Overseas Options Dwindle, RESOURCE RECYCLING
(Aug. 21, 2018), http://perma.cc/3XEQ-5UXM.
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restrictions that China began to implement on recyclables imports. 80 The Chinese
Minister of Environmental Protection Li Ganjie noted in a press conference on
March 17, 2018 that the volume of solid waste imports to China dropped twelve
percent in 2017 (and the restrictions were not even in place for the entire year). 81
Chinese domestic recyclable materials have experienced large price increases
while international recyclable material prices have fallen, likely due to artificial
scarcity within China and artificial surplus abroad. 82 In 2017 the price for Old
Corrugated Cardboard (OCC) from the U.S. fell by nearly thirty-six percent to a
low of $93 per metric ton while Chinese domestic OCC prices soared to nearly
$500 per metric ton. 83 In April 2018, U.S. domestic OCC was trading for $74 per
ton, and industry leaders attributed the low prices to the enormous bargaining
power that buyers had over sorting facilities because of the surplus of domestic
supply resulting from reduced shipments to China. 84 In 2018, the largest
residential North American hauling company (Waste Management) saw a nineteen
percent decrease in revenue during the second quarter, while the second largest
(Republic Services) saw a seven percent decrease, the third-largest (Waste
Connections) saw a forty-eight percent decrease, 85 the fourth-largest (Advanced
Disposal) saw a fifty-three percent decrease, and the fifth-largest (Casella Waste
Systems) saw a forty-one percent decrease. 86 These decreased revenues have direct
impacts on the companies being harmed, but they also have indirect impacts
across the rest of the U.S. economy: jobs may be cut and spending and
infrastructure investments at plants may decrease, and these effects ripple
outwards. 87 While the indirect effects are likely to be large, but difficult to quantify,
the direct economic impacts on recycling are large and more easily estimated. The

80

Jared Paben, China’s Policies Whack Hauler Earnings in Late 2017, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Feb. 27,
2018), http://perma.cc/ZRL6-HQW4.

81

China’s Solid Waste Imports Decline 12 Percent in 2017: Minister, CCTV (Mar. 17, 2018),
http://perma.cc/8JBX-YVLF.

82

Colin Staub, Chinese Actions Tank US OCC Prices, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://perma.cc/HPY5-ZA4A.

83

Id.
Colin Staub, What Depressed OCC Means for the Recycling Industry, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Apr. 10,
2018), http://perma.cc/T4B8-5V4K.
Jared Paben, Publicly Traded Haulers Report Commodity Price Pains, RESOURCE RECYCLING (July 31,
2018), http://perma.cc/5HL3-ND2H.
Jared Paben, Depressed Fiber Prices Felt by Casella and Advanced, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Aug. 7, 2018),
http://perma.cc/5H7M-XK6C.
For example, a recycling company in Montana was forced to cut its staff in response to decreased
recyclable materials prices and in Florida a city suspended its recycling program entirely. How
Recycling is Changing in All 50 States, WASTE DIVE (Feb. 1, 2019), http://perma.cc/D4EW-CR8K.
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total value of the recyclable materials banned by the Chinese restrictions in 2016
alone has been estimated at $479 million. 88

E. China in the WTO and its Relationship with the U.S.
Section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 89 requires the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) to annually prepare a report on China’s compliance
with its commitments under the WTO and any multilateral or bilateral treaties
existing between the U.S. and China. 90 The 2017 USTR report stated that China’s
protectionist stance is “worse today than it was five years ago.” 91
The U.S. foreign trade deficit with East Asia has become a deficit in trade
with China alone rather than a deficit with multiple East Asian nations. In 2015,
the East Asia share of the U.S. global trade deficit was sixty-seven percent, and it
was sixty-eight percent twenty years prior. 92 However, from 2000 to 2015 the
U.S.’s trade deficit with China grew by nearly $300 billion (from $83 billion to
$366 billion, an increase of over 440 percent), meaning that China provides a
significantly larger proportion of goods to the U.S. Most recently, the USTR’s
report on China’s compliance with its accession agreements to the WTO stated
that the 2017 goods trade deficit between the U.S. and China was expected to
reach $365 billion by the end of the year. 93
U.S. trade dialogue with China began with the U.S.-China Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) in 2003. 94 In 2006, the U.S.-China Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED) was created to occur in parallel with the JCCT. Then
the SED was replaced by the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
(S&ED) in 2009. Finally, in 2017 the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic
Dialogue replaced the JCCT and the S&ED. 95 Although these trade dialogues are
ongoing, it is unlikely that the issues created by the recycling restrictions can be
solved through dialogue alone.

88
89
90
91

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 72, at 69.
Pub. L. No. 106-286, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (West 2000).
22 U.S.C. § 6951(a) (2018).
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 72, at 2.

92

US-China Business Council, China’s Implementation of its World Trade Organization Commitments, Written
Testimony in Response to US Trade Representative’s Request for Comments and Notice of Public
Hearing Concerning China’s Compliance with WTO Commitments (81 Fed. Reg. 54,646) (Sept.
21, 2016), http://perma.cc/SAT7-86RJ.
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UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 72, at 4.
Although the Commission was founded in 1983, it was not “elevated” to be a discussion forum
until 2003. Id. at 3.
Id.
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The current “trade war” between the U.S. and China makes addressing and
solving the problems presented by these restrictions through talks and WTO
comments alone unlikely. China and the U.S. have gone through multiple backand-forth tariff increases since the end of 2017, with tariffs in place on everything
from solar panels to steel to soybeans. 96 As of October 22, 2018, the U.S. has
imposed tariffs worth up to $250 billion, and the Chinese government has
imposed tariffs worth $60 billion. 97 On August 23, 2018, China requested
consultations with the U.S. through the WTO (the first step in the WTO’s dispute
resolution procedure) in response to the tariffs that the U.S. has put in place. 98
Furthermore, a representative of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference, a legislative body aimed at building alliances with other countries,
stated that the country was not afraid of a trade war with the U.S. and that China
has simply taken necessary counteractions to respond to U.S. aggression. 99 Such
statements, and such high economic stakes, make it unlikely that the two countries
will be able to reach an agreement on the recyclables restrictions China currently
has in place while also facing trade war tensions.

III. L EGAL B ACKGROUND
China’s domestic laws and international obligations provide context for
examining these restrictions, and its obligations as a WTO member are a potential
avenue for the U.S. to attack the restrictions. China’s environment is in a
precarious condition, and its domestic environmental law regime has not achieved
a sufficient level of environmental protection. This could indicate either that the
government needs to incorporate international restrictions into its environmental
protection scheme, or that environmental protection may be a pretextual
justification for trade restrictions. As a member of the WTO, China is bound by
the treaties that bind other WTO members, including the GATT. 100 The GATT
prohibits certain trade restrictions, and could be an avenue through which the U.S.
could challenge the Chinese restrictions. The Chinese government has also
discussed the Basel Convention, an international treaty intended to limit the
movement of hazardous waste between nations, in conjunction with its
96

97

Chad P. Brown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-To-Date Guide, PETERSON
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Sept. 24, 2018), http://perma.cc/4BWX-6YHZ.
Schwartz, supra note 14.

98

Requests for Consultations by China, United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China II,
WTO DOC. WT/DS565/1, G/L/1260 (Aug. 27, 2018).

99

Id.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S.
154, art. 2 ¶ 2 (stating that all agreements included in Annex 1, which includes the GATT, bind all
WTO members).
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restrictions. However, since the U.S. has not ratified the Convention, it is unlikely
to protect the Chinese restrictions from U.S. challenges.

A. Chinese Environmental Issues and Environmental Law
Chairman Mao Zedong’s often-cited approach to environmental issues
during his time as China’s leader was that man must conquer nature, with no
apparent concern for the environmental costs associated with such conquest. 101
That policy-backed laissez-faire approach to the environmental externalities of
economic productivity led to severe environmental degradation during Mao’s time
and beyond. 102 Commenters have noted that China currently maintains many
environmentally-harmful policies while still grappling with severe issues of
pollution and environmental damage. 103 In 1997, the World Bank published a
study finding that China’s mid-1990s air and water pollution alone cost the
country more than $32.3 billion due to premature deaths, morbidity, restricted
activity, and other negative health effects. 104 Those astronomical costs were
estimated without taking into account the direct impacts on the environment that
do not also impact human health. 105
While many of the policies that have caused harm to China’s environment
are not in the waste sector, commentators have noted that China’s historical
approach to waste imports (freely accepting them and lax inspection of waste
shipments) has also led to severe environmental degradation. 106
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest legislative body in
China, and its standing committee can enact and amend all fundamental laws with
101

102

Robert V. Percival, China’s Green Leap Forward toward Global Environmental Leadership, 12 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 633, 636 (2011).
Jackson Ewing, Tough Tasks for China’s New Environment Ministry, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 17, 2018),
http://perma.cc/D6XF-X39N; Yanzhong Huang, Tackling China’s Environmental Health Crisis,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 14, 2015), http://perma.cc/7C2N-U4HE.

103

Stephanie Beyer, Environmental Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
185, 187 (2006).

104

THE WORLD BANK, CLEAR WATER, BLUE SKIES: CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEW CENTURY
23 (1997), http://perma.cc/AR3M-H5SV.

105

Id. at 7 (“Because air and water pollution are the most damaging to human health, worker
productivity, and agricultural output, they are the focus of this report.”).

106

Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges after China’s WTO Accession, 32 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 41,
45–46 (2007).
China has also paid a high environmental cost for accepting waste imports and
relocation of polluting industries from developed countries. The importation of
waste started long before the 1980s and reached its peak level in the mid-1990s
when the Chinese government finally recognized the irreversible environmental
harm of such trade and strengthened its solid waste management law to control
and prohibit the import of waste.
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the exception of fundamental national statutes. 107 The standing committee of the
NPC passed China’s first environmentally-focused statute, the Environmental
Protection Law, in 1979 as a trial statute. 108 It was later amended and codified
without “trial” status in 1989, but remained vague in its language about
environmental protection, asserting goals rather than setting out specific
requirements. 109
The Environmental Protection Law’s vagueness appears to be a common
theme in Chinese environmental law. Commentators have noted that Chinese
environmental laws often seem to be more aspirational than setting strict
standards, frequently due to technological limitations. 110 In addition to the
difficulty that polluters face in meeting the standards that China has imposed
through its environmental laws, industries have also at times found that it is more
economical to pollute and pay a fee rather than clean up their pollutants. 111
This state of affairs potentially reveals that the Chinese government has to
use international trade restrictions to achieve environmental protection because
of its failed domestic policy. However, it could also be read to indicate that the
country values economic growth over environmental protection and that the
restrictions’ environmental justifications are pretextual.

B. International Trade Law Governing This Issue
China gained approval to join the WTO on November 10, 2001 and joined
the WTO on November 11, 2001. 112 By joining the WTO, China became subject
107

Richard J. Ferris Jr., Hongung Zhang, Reaching out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing Efforts to
Develop an Effective Environmental Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 569, 576 (2003).

108

Id. at 582.
Charles McElwee, Shaping China’s Green Laws, CHINADIALOGUE (July 22,
http://perma.cc/AY6R-FEUK.
Ferris, supra note 107, at 599.
In a number of situations, compliance with Chinese environmental laws requires
access to sophisticated infrastructure that does not exist, or does not exist in
sufficient quantity and quality… This particular situation is indicative of what
may be a slightly ‘aspirational’ approach to the drafting of environmental laws.
This approach disregards the immediate practicability of the law in question in
favor of targets that are environmentally attractive, but largely unattainable using
existing infrastructure or technology.
Zhao, supra note 106, at 75.
A pollution charge mechanism has been in place since 1979 when China’s first
piece of national environmental legislation, the Environmental Protection Law
(for trial use), was enacted. It has not, however, effectively tackled China’s
pollution problem because charges imposed have been far below the cost of
pollution treatment, and enterprises have chosen to pollute and pay charges
rather than take environmental protection measures to minimize pollution.
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 72.

109

110

111

112

Summer 2019

309

2011),

Chicago Journal of International Law

to the same obligations that bind all other WTO members. China’s accession
protocol states that the country must “ensure that the same technical regulations,
standards and conformity assessment procedures are applied to both imported
and domestic products.” 113 Annex 1A of China’s Accession Protocol requires that
China provide information on the “repeal and cessation of all WTO inconsistent
laws, regulations and other methods on national treatment.” 114 “National
treatment” refers to the practice of treating goods from foreign nations the same
way that similar domestic goods are treated. 115 By acceding to the WTO, China
also agreed to comply with all of the restrictions on trade barriers that are
contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

1. The GATT provides limited exceptions for otherwise WTOincompatible trade restrictions.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is an international legal
agreement that preceded the WTO but remains in force as binding upon all WTO
members. 116 The GATT imposes three primary rules. First, countries must treat
products from all countries equally. Second, countries must treat foreign products
the same way that similar domestic products are treated (that is, national
treatment). Third, countries cannot impose other types of restrictions on products
(like quotas and licensing schemes) that would change the conditions of
competition. 117
GATT Article XX provides exceptions for some restrictions on trade that
would otherwise be prohibited under the GATT. 118 Only the exception under
Article XX(b) is relevant here, so this Comment will focus on that subsection. 119
Article XX(b), which can be referred to as the environmental exception, creates

113

114

World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO DOC.
WT/L/432, 13 – Technical Barriers to Trade, ¶ 4(a).
World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Annex 1A:
Information to be Provided by China in the Context of the Transitional Review Mechanism, WTO DOC.
WT/L/432, II Economic Policies, ¶ 1(a).

115

Peter M. Gerhart & Michael S. Baron, Understanding National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the
WTO, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 505 (2004).

116

Wold, supra note 16.
Id. See also GATT, supra note 15.

117
118
119

GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX.
XX(g) is the only other exception under Article XX that deals with environmentally motivated
restrictions. However, XX(g) only covers restrictions put in place to conserve exhaustible natural
resources. China has not indicated its restrictions are motivated by any desire to conserve natural
resources (and restrictions on recyclable material imports are arguably antithetical to conserving
natural resources).
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an exception for regulations that are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant
life or health.” 120
Qualifying for the exception under Article XX(b) requires proof that first,
the regulation would protect human, animal or plant life, and second, that the
regulation is necessary to do so. Because of the way that “necessary” has been
defined in WTO Appellate Body case law, it seems harder to prove necessity than
to prove that the regulation would protect life or health. 121 “Necessary” has been
interpreted to mean that the proponent of the regulation must show that no
WTO-compatible or less-restrictive regulation exists that was reasonably available
to pursue the country’s desired policy goal. 122

2. The Basel Convention governs many U.N. members’ trade in waste,
but does not bind the U.S.
Li Ganjie, China’s Minister of Environmental Protection, mentioned in a
2018 press conference that China’s bevy of recycling restrictions could potentially
be seen as an attempt to follow the spirit of the Basel Convention and push each
country to deal domestically with the hazardous waste produced within its
borders. 123 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal was first opened for signature on March
22, 1989 and ultimately entered into force on May 5, 1992. 124 The Convention
generally deals with movement of hazardous waste and is specifically aimed at
preventing the transfer of hazardous waste to countries classified as
“developing.” 125 The U.S. and Haiti are the only two countries that have signed
the Basel Convention but have not ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to

120

GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX(b).

121

The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry has produced a report in which it breaks
down the success and failure of suits in which countries have attempted to use Article XX(b). There
is one instance in which a country met the burden of proof for health effects and failed to meet the
burden of proof for necessity. Conversely, there have been no instances in which a country was
able to meet the burden of proof for necessity and not meet the burden of proof for health effects.
Although this information is limited, it suggests that it is easier to meet the burden of proof for
health effects than it is to meet the burden for necessity. 2016 Report on Compliance by Major Trading
Partners with Trade Agreements, Part II Chapter 4: “Justifiable Reasons,” JAPANESE MINISTRY OF
ECONOMY TRADE AND INDUSTRY, 334, Figure II-4-5 (2016), http://perma.cc/29P4-M3DL.
Joel P. Trachtman, WTO Trade and Environment Jurisprudence: Avoiding Environmental Catastrophe, 58
HARV. INT’L L. J. 273, 291 (2017).
CCTV, supra note 81.

122
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Christine Terada, Recycling Electronic Wastes in Nigeria: Putting Environmental and Human Rights at Risk,
10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 154 (2012).

125

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
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it. 126 The U.S. did not sign the Convention until 1990, and the Convention has
never gone into force for the U.S. Thus, although China could potentially cite the
Basel Convention as justification for its restrictions, it would be unable to use the
Convention to counter a U.S. attack on the restrictions because the Convention
does not bind the U.S. 127

IV. P OTENTIAL WTO S UIT AND R AMIFICATIONS
WTO case law makes it likely that the U.S. would win a WTO dispute if it
decided to file suit against China to challenge the restrictions. China’s restrictions
likely violate the national treatment requirement of the GATT. 128 It is unlikely that
China would be able to surmount the multiple barriers to establishing a claim that
its restrictions are covered by the Article XX(b) exception to the GATT’s general
requirements. Thus, China would likely not be able to defend its restrictions in a
WTO dispute.
There are many costs associated with the U.S. filing a suit in the WTO, and
the costs likely outweigh the benefits, even if the U.S. would likely win the suit.
Costs include diplomatic fallout with China, as well as economic retaliation.
Furthermore, its suit could be seen as environmental imperialism by attempting
to force China to accept the U.S.’s waste just as China is attempting to clean up
its environment. Additionally, China may not comply with a WTO decision even
if the U.S. wins. 129

126

Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, SECRETARIAT OF THE BASEL CONVENTION, http://perma.cc/36MX-FD73.

127

The Vienna Convention states that every treaty in force “is binding upon the parties to it.” Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Interestingly, the U.S. is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but China is, so it would likely be
bound by this convention even in attempting to push against a non-party. Furthermore, that
provision of the Convention is a customary international law called pacta sunt servanda, and such
customary laws would bind the U.S. and China. Josef L. Koons, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm
Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 180, 181 (1945).
China has just begun to require separating trash and recycling, which is a far lower standard than
the standard to which international recyclable imports are held. Brian Taylor, China’s MEP Announces
Mandatory Recycling Intentions, RECYCLING TODAY (Jan. 2, 2018), http://perma.cc/CL8E-NG5S.
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China has previously failed to comply with a WTO decision in a dispute between the U.S. and
China. See Report of the Panel, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products
from the United States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS427/RW (Jan. 18,
2018), 125–26.
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A. WTO Suit
1. The Chinese restrictions potentially violate the GATT.
The E.U. and the U.S. have responded to China’s restrictions with letters
and statements to the WTO, arguing that the restrictions were implemented too
quickly and could result in waste diversions that are ultimately worse for the
environment. 130 Both countries alluded to the apparent disparity in placing such
restrictions on international shipments of recyclables without placing the same
restrictions on domestic recyclables. 131 The Chinese government responded via
the WTO on July 4, 2018, stating that at least one goal of the measures was to
ensure that each country processes waste within its own border. 132 Additionally,
the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries provided a letter attributed to the
Chinese government responding to U.S. concerns in more detail. 133 The letter
cited Chinese concerns for protecting a degraded environment as a major factor
behind the restrictions. It also stated that the restrictions do not violate China’s
national treatment requirement since the standards are merely border measures
regarding importation and thus could not be applied to domestic products. 134
If the U.S. were to challenge the Chinese restrictions via the WTO, the best
method would be arguing that these restrictions violate the national treatment
requirement. 135 To do so, the U.S. would first establish that, for recycling
purposes, Chinese recyclables are similar to recyclables coming from other
countries. 136 Next, it would establish that the Chinese government has placed
stringent restrictions and requirements on international shipments of
130

Statement by the European Union to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 21 and 22
March 2018, China – Chinese Environmental Protection Control Standards for Imported Solid Waste as Raw
Materials, G/TBT/W/472 (Apr. 16, 2018); Statement by the United States to the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade 21 and 22 March 2018, China – Chinese Environmental Protection Control
Standards for Imported Solid Waste as Raw Materials, G/TBT/W/468 (Mar. 21, 2018).
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Statement by China to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 20 and 21 June 2018, China
– Chinese Environmental Protection Control Standards for Imported Solid Waste as Raw Materials,
G/TBT/W/547 (July 4, 2018).
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Colin Staub, China: Waste Restrictions Will Spur U.S. Job Growth, RESOURCE RECYCLING (June 19,
2018), http://perma.cc/9NDR-PA6F.
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Letter from Chinese WTO TBT Representative to US WTO TBT Representative, translated and
provided by the Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries, http://perma.cc/462X-LCHT.
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The GATT, which applies to “products,” would cover imports of recyclable materials as shipments
of commodities; there are product codes for recyclable materials under the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding Systems. See, for example, “Harmonized Systems Code 3915,”
FOREIGN TRADE ONLINE, http://perma.cc/DYV6-KHYU.
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For example, the Old Corrugated Cardboard being traded in China is the same as that being traded
in the U.S. The only difference is their price. See Staub, supra note 82.
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recyclables. 137 Finally, it would establish that China has not implemented the same
stringent restrictions and requirements upon its domestic recyclables. 138 Framed
this way, the restrictions may violate the national treatment requirement, especially
because commentators have read WTO Appellate Body case law as interpreting
the GATT’s prohibition on measures violating national treatment broadly. For
example, Ming Du writes that the case law seems to classify as violating national
treatment any negative impact on imports without a negative impact on domestic
products, without looking at the regulatory purpose of the action. 139 Given the
potential violation of the GATT, China would have to prove that its restrictions
fall under some sort of exception. The most likely exception for the restrictions,
given their characterization as environmental protection regulations, is Article
XX(b).

2. WTO Appellate Body case law sets high standards for GATT
exceptions.
Any country hoping to meet the XX(b) exception will be subject to the test
laid out by the WTO Appellate Body in China – Publications and Audiovisual
Products. 140 In his analysis of WTO jurisprudence regarding necessity, Joel
Trachtman writes that the WTO Appellate Body decision in China – Publications
and Audiovisual Products combined a multifactor test from one case with a
procedure developed in another case. 141 The factors that the Appellate Body has
directed Dispute Resolution Panels to consider originated in the decision in Korea
– Various Measures on Beef. In a later opinion, US – Gambling, the Appellate Body
laid out a set of procedures that Panels should take when considering whether the
disputed provisions are “necessary.” 142 By combining the procedural and
substantive steps from these two cases, the decision in China – Publications and
Audiovisual Products set a high bar for countries attempting to meet the necessity
exception.
137

138

Discussing China’s stringent contamination and inspection standards should be sufficient, though
depending upon when the U.S. files its suit, China may have already implemented total bans on
international recyclable shipments. See Staub, supra note 25.
China has only recently begun requiring municipalities to collect recycling separate from garbage,
which seems to be a far lower standard than requiring that recycling be virtually uncontaminated.
Taylor, supra note 128.
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Ming Du, ‘Treatment No Less Favorable’ and the Future of National Treatment Obligation in GATT Article
III:4 after EC – Seal Products, 15 WORLD TRADE REV. 139, 163 (2015).
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Appellate Body Report, China–Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶¶ 238–42, WTO DOC. WT/DS363/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
Trachtman, supra note 122, at 292–93.
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Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, ¶¶ 306–11, WTO DOC. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
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The analysis begins with the Korea – Various Measures on Beef 143 factors.
Trachtman describes these factors as: (1) how much the measure will contribute
towards achieving the desired compliance, (2) the importance of the common
interests or values protected by the regulation, and (3) the impact of the law on
imports or exports. 144 The Appellate Body has stated that the three factors must
be balanced against each other. 145 Each factor is weighed according to the
magnitude of its effect, without any single factor being dispositive. 146
Importantly, Korea – Various Measures on Beef deals with the definition of
“necessary” under XX(d). However, since the language of necessity is the same in
(d) and (b), Trachtman asserts that the interpretation of this word in section (d) is
the same as the interpretation in section (b). 147 The WTO Analytical Index for
Article XX supports this conclusion. 148 This three-factor analysis is then
incorporated into the procedure the WTO Appellate Body laid out in US –
Gambling.
Trachtman’s analysis of US – Gambling states that the procedure is as follows:
first, the proponent of the regulation must make a prima facie case that the
regulation is necessary under the Korea – Various Measures on Beef factors. 149 Second,
the complaining party has the opportunity to lay out alternative, potentially lesstrade-restrictive measures that the proponent of the regulation could have taken
instead of the measures that are currently in place. 150 Third, the proponent of the
regulation has the opportunity to prove that the proposed alternative does not
meet the goal of the challenged regulation or is not reasonably available. 151 Because
the decision in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products required the factors from
Korea – Various Measures on Beef as well as the procedure from US – Gambling, China

143
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Body
Report,
Korea-Various
Measures
on
WT/DS161/AB/R./WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000).
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Trachtman, supra note 122, at 291 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea-Various Measures on Beef,
WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R./WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000)).

145

Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 182, WTO Doc.
WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007).
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Korea-Various Measures on Beef, supra note 143, at ¶¶ 162–63.
Trachtman, supra note 122, at 290–91 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea-Various Measures on Beef,
WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R./WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000)).
GATT 1994 – Article XX (Jurisprudence) in WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice,
11.
Trachtman, supra note 122, at 292 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 306–11, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 7, 2005)).
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would be subject to this dual scrutiny if required to defend its recyclables import
restrictions against accusations by the U.S. that they violate the GATT.
Trachtman subsequently cites the Appellate Body’s decision in Brazil –
Retreaded Tyres as an example of the Appellate Body using this approach but failing
to get an accurate understanding of the potential impacts of different measures on
human health and to engage in balancing the required considerations against each
other when determining necessity. 152 It is not apparent whether this failure
benefits the proponent of a regulation or the challenger, which makes the outcome
potentially more uncertain than the case law would suggest on its face.
Even if China were to successfully navigate the procedures for showing its
regulations were “necessary,” proving that a trade measure falls under the
exception from Article XX(b) is a two-step process. 153 First, the WTO Panel will
determine if the regulation falls under XX(b) (using the process laid out above).
Next, the Panel will ask if the regulation violates the chapeau (an introductory
paragraph that sets certain backstop requirements for GATT exceptions) 154 of
Article XX. The chapeau requires that the measure in question does not “constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and also is not a “disguised
restriction on international trade.” 155 This chapeau provision essentially acts as a
backstop to prevent a country from asserting an ostensibly acceptable justification
for an otherwise prohibited regulation.

B. Likely Outcome of WTO Dispute
The Chinese government’s communications regarding the various recycling
restrictions make it seem as though China is confident it would win a WTO
dispute regarding the restrictions’ potential violation of the GATT. However, it
actually appears more likely that the U.S. could convince the WTO otherwise. The
effects and implementation of the restrictions, together with the difficulty in
meeting the exception requirements for Article XX(g) of the GATT, make it
unlikely that China would succeed.
The Chinese government also does not seem to acknowledge the difficulty
of attempting to argue that their restrictions fall under the Article XX(b) exception
to the GATT. It would be difficult to argue that the restrictions are strictly
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life, or health (as required under
152

Id. at 293 (citing Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc,
WT/DS332/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007), as modified by Appellate Body Report
WTIDS332/AB/R).

153

Id. at 290.
WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://perma.cc/6CCW-6LKU (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX.
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Article XX(b)). 156 While imported waste can certainly pose a danger to human and
environmental health, its negative effects can potentially be prevented by
imposing stricter safety requirements on firms storing or processing that waste. 157
Furthermore, the health risks might be considered too minor to justify the
restrictions as necessary. In European Communities – Asbestos, 158 the WTO Appellate
Body held that the French restrictions on chrysotile asbestos imports were
“necessary” under Article XX(b) because of the serious health risks associated
with the material such as lung cancer, mesothelioma, and asbestosis. 159 The health
risks that come from some types of contaminated recyclables shipments (for
instance, a shipment of plastic bottles with some pizza boxes mixed in) are likely
to be too minor in comparison to the health risks that were held to be sufficient
in European Community – Asbestsos. The risks of the recycling industry in China seem
more concentrated in the processing of recyclable materials, rather than from the
materials themselves. News stories telling of unventilated spaces where workers
wear no protection and caustic chemicals and melting plastic abound. 160 These
situations pose serious health risks, but the risks are arguably not due to
contaminated shipments but rather due to insufficient worker protections. Thus, if the
Chinese government is attempting to protect human health, it should do so by
implementing regulations on recyclables processing, rather than recyclables shipments.
It would also be difficult for China to argue that the restrictions, even if
necessary, do not violate the chapeau of Article XX. 161 As will be discussed
following an examination of Article XX(b)’s requirements, the chapeau requires
that a restriction not be a disguised restriction on trade. 162 It is possible that a
WTO Panel would find the restrictions were actually disguised restrictions on
trade because of China’s inconsistent environmental protection, as well as the
economic benefits potentially accruing from these restrictions.

156

Id. at art. XX(g).

157

For example, requiring waste processing firms to store waste in enclosed spaces would prevent the
waste being carried from the site by natural forces and harming plant or animal life. Containment
requirements could prevent leachate (liquid that has percolated through a collection of waste and
carries some constituents of the waste) from spreading and contaminating groundwater.
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Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, WTO DOC. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001).
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Id. at ¶ 192.
See, for example, Adam Minter, Plastic, Poverty, and Pollution in China’s Recycling Dead Zone, THE
GUARDIAN (July 16, 2014), http://perma.cc/2P7L-7V2Y.
GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX.
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Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on
Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739, 744 (2001).
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1. The restrictions’ impacts on imports make an exception under
XX(b) unlikely.
Of the three factors that must be considered when determining whether a
measure is necessary—(1) effect on imports, (2) likelihood that the restrictions
will achieve compliance, and (3) the importance of the value being protected—
the restrictions’ impacts on imports (factor 1) are likely to cut strongly against
China. When balancing the factors, each factor must be weighted according to the
magnitude of its impact. 163 China has readily discussed the severe impact that these
restrictions have had on the import of recyclable materials to China—citing a 12
percent drop in recyclables imports for the year of 2017 despite the restrictions
not being in place for much of the year. 164 It has been estimated that the plastic
waste displaced from 2018 to 2030 will be 47 percent of all plastic waste that has
been imported since 1988. 165 Furthermore, in its database tracking the impacts of
the restrictions on the U.S., Waste Dive (a U.S.-based waste industry publication)
has found that the economic and regulatory effects are strong in thirteen states,
noticeable in twenty eight, and minimal in only nine states. 166 The other two
factors are less clear-cut, but even if the WTO finds that the remaining factors
support China’s restrictions it is possible that factor 1’s severe negative impacts
will outweigh any support factors 2 and 3 can provide for the restrictions.

2. The uncertainty of success may cut against an Article XX(b)
exception.
The other two factors potentially favor China, but they are harder to quantify
and seem potentially insignificant compared to the negative impacts on imports.
Regarding the compliance achieved (factor 2), it is likely that there are fewer
imports of contaminated recyclables coming into China because there are fewer
recyclables coming in generally. 167 It is not clear that the waste stream flowing to
Chinese recycling facilities is any cleaner, since there is no indication that the same
contamination restrictions have been placed on domestic recyclables. 168 The E.U.
163

Korea-Various Measures on Beef, supra note 143, at ¶¶ 162–63.

164

CCTV, supra note 81.
Brooks, supra note 13.
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What Chinese Import Policies Mean for All 50 States, WASTE DIVE (Nov. 1, 2018),
http://perma.cc/MN3T-Y6ZR.
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CCTV, supra note 81.
Taylor, supra note 128. In 2016, China imported roughly 7.35 million metric tons of recyclable
plastics and generated an estimated nearly 61 million metric tons of recyclable plastics. Brooks et
al., Supplementary Materials, supra note 36, at Table S4. Thus, if the Chinese government wanted
to ensure it had the greatest impact on reducing contamination in recycling, it would make sense
for the government to also place restrictions on domestic recyclables.
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specifically asked China to inform the members of the WTO what the domestic
regulations for recyclables contamination were, and has received no response. 169
It is also possible that these restrictions will lead to fewer overflowing waste
piles because the volume of contaminated waste will be reduced and thus the
feedstock for the waste piles would be reduced. However, without an initial
understanding of the prevalence of such piles it is hard to say that there is an actual
numeric difference. Furthermore, since at least some of the contaminated
recyclables shipments were smuggled in, it is impossible to tell whether these
restrictions have led to any change in illegal imports of recyclables. (In fact, it is
possible that more recyclables exporters have turned to smuggling and increased
the flow of illegal shipments.) 170 The Chinese government has claimed that the
programs have been successful—reporting that they have captured 110,000 tons
as of April 2018 171—but since it is impossible to know how many smuggled
shipments have been successfully imported, it would be invalid to assert that the
programs are definitely successful. As a result, it is not necessarily apparent that
these restrictions have achieved or will achieve their stated environmental
protection goals.

3. China’s environmentally harmful policy may contradict its supposed
interest in protection.
Regarding the importance of the value being protected, the Chinese
government has indicated that these restrictions are intended to protect the
Chinese environment and to encourage local management of waste. 172 Both of
these values are laudable and important. However, since the restrictions have
apparently not been implemented on domestic wastes, it appears that the
government has not fully committed to protecting the values it has espoused. 173
Furthermore, the aspirational nature of many Chinese domestic environmental
laws, as previously discussed, may further indicate a lack of commitment to
environmental protection. That may negatively impact whether the WTO weighs
this factor in favor of China because it could indicate that the values being asserted
here are not truly the interest China is attempting to protect.
169

170

171
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Statement by the European Union to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 21 and 22
March 2018, China – Chinese Environmental Protection Control Standards for Imported Solid Waste as Raw
Materials, G/TBT/W/472 (Apr. 16, 2018).
China Customs Seizes 110,000 Tonnes of Smuggled Waste This Year, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr.
3, 2018), http://perma.cc/R8MV-UYCH.
Id.
Statement by China to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 20 and 21 June 2018, China
– Chinese Environmental Protection Control Standards for Imported Solid Waste as Raw Materials,
G/TBT/W/547 (July 4, 2018).
Taylor, supra note 128.
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4. The restrictions are likely not the least trade restrictive option.
In addition to trying to meet the Korea–Various Measures on Beef factors, China
would also have to show that these restrictions are the least trade restrictive
measures possible to achieve its goal. 174 Under US–Gambling, the WTO Appellate
Body has allowed the challenging country to suggest any less-restrictive measure
as an alternative. 175 China would then have to prove that the suggested alternative
was impractical to implement for the restrictions to be permitted to remain. 176
There are many potential alternative measures that could have been taken:
restricting fewer products from being imported, setting the maximum
contamination percentage at a more feasible level, and capping the amount of
restricted materials of each category that can be imported (rather than outright
banning them). China would have to prove that each of these potential measures
was infeasible, and given the fact that recyclers in the country may still deal with
domestic recyclables not subject to the same contamination level restrictions, it is
not apparent that these alternative measures would meet this burden. Essentially,
if the domestic recyclers can deal with contaminated domestic recyclables, it is not
apparent that using a strict but not overly strict contamination level on imports
was somehow infeasible—especially if the contamination level was set lower than
the level for domestic recyclables.

5. The chapeau of Article XX poses a further barrier to XX(b)
exception.
Finally, even if China is able to convince the WTO Panel that these
restrictions do fall under Article XX(b), the restrictions still likely violate the
chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau requires that any restrictions falling under the
Article XX exceptions must not be “disguised restriction[s]” on international
trade. 177 While China has indicated that its restrictions are intended to protect the
environment and ensure that all countries deal with their own waste locally, the
restrictions have had large positive financial impacts on Chinese domestic
recyclables dealers 178 while the impacts on foreign recyclables dealers have been
174

Trachtman, supra note 122, at 292 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 306–11, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
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GATT, supra note 15, at art. XX.
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One example is plastic pricing: current market price for PET in China rose from between 5,500 to
6,000 yuan per ton in 2017 to between 6,500 to 6,800 yuan per ton. Sarah Talaat, How China’s
“Foreign Waste” Ban Might Spur its Domestic Recycling Program, SUP CHINA (July 2, 2018),
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the opposite. 179 For example, the nearly $400 per ton price difference between
Chinese domestic cardboard and international cardboard has significantly
benefited Chinese domestic recyclables dealers. 180 Admittedly, the artificially
restricted supply has caused some difficulty for Chinese manufacturers who
depend upon recyclables as an input into their production. 181 However, these
manufacturers are adapting by starting to build processing plants abroad. For
example, Nine Dragons, a Chinese paper company, purchased a mill in the U.S.
to maintain the input flow of recyclables necessary to continue production. 182 This
response means that manufacturers are able to take advantage of the low
recyclable material prices abroad while recyclables dealers in China are still able to
sell their material for high prices domestically. As a result, while the Chinese
government has put an environmental gloss on these restrictions, the restrictions
also seem to disproportionately benefit Chinese companies and restrict
international trade. If that is the case, the restrictions violate the chapeau of Article
XX. Thus, it is unlikely that China would be able to argue that these restrictions

179

180

up domestic recycling infrastructure. See Leone Young, China: One Year On, WASTE360 (July 10,
2018), http://perma.cc/65B7-BRU7 (discussing “China’s recent focus on cleaning up its
environment and boosting its domestic recycling infrastructure”). The “staggering” shortfall in
supply for paper products, for example, means that recyclables suppliers can charge higher prices
for their goods. See Colin Staub, China Faces “Staggering” Shortfall in Recovered Fiber Supply, RESOURCE
RECYCLING (May 30, 2018), http://perma.cc/EP4Z-JFVF. One Chinese recycling company
reported that it had a capacity for 50,000 tons of recyclable plastic bottles but was currently only
collecting 30,000; however, there were seemingly widespread expectations that once a shift in
consumer behavior occurred the supply would drastically increase. Saša Petricic, China is No Longer
the World’s Dumping Ground, but Cleaning up its Own Backyard is Proving to be a Challenge, CBC NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2018), http://perma.cc/TMG2-UP2K. The government has pushed to create local
recycling collection centers to increase the domestic supply of recyclables, which Chinese
corporations have been making use of. David Stanway, China Starts New Recycling Drive as Foreign
Trash Ban Widens, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2019), http://perma.cc/VK4M-JQMV.
Waste Management, a major recyclables supplier in the U.S., reported in January 2019 that it expects
its earnings from recycling to decrease by $100 million compared to the previous year. Andrea
Leinfelder, Texas Recyclers Face Challenges of Weak Demand, Low Prices, EL PASO TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019),
http://perma.cc/PBK5-585V. In the U.S., aluminum (one of many affected resources) surpluses
as a result of the restrictions (and other tariffs) have created “a complete buyers’ market.” Bob Tita,
Aluminum Scrap Abounds Thanks to Tariffs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2019), http://perma.cc/9NGUFETZ. Waste 360 reports that mixed paper has been “virtually worthless and increasingly has to be
landfilled.” Young, supra note 178.
Staub, supra note 82.
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2018), http://perma.cc/3F32-V7GK.
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Colin Staub, U.S. Recycled Pulp Mill Purchased by Paper Giant, RESOURCE RECYCLING (Sept. 5, 2018),
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do not violate the GATT even if it is able to claim that they fall under the Article
XX(b) exception.

C. Potential Ramifications of a Successful WTO Suit
If the U.S. were to successfully bring a claim against China and thus require
China to bring its regulations into compliance with the national treatment
requirement, there would be readily apparent benefits, like increased profits and
less pollution. U.S. recycling shipments could potentially regain their value
relatively quickly—which could increase the profits for many U.S. recycling
companies harmed by the restrictions. Additionally, recyclables that many
recycling sorters have either disposed of in landfills or left sitting in warehouses
would be put to a positive use. Importantly, the suit is not certain to be successful
so the expected value of these benefits is lower than it would be if the suit were
sure to be successful. Furthermore, it is possible that China may not fully comply
with a decision requiring it to eliminate its restrictions, making any benefits of a
successful suit uncertain (further lowering the expected value of the suit). 183
Additionally, there are expected negative values associated with the ethical issues
of forcing this type of change, as well as the certain diplomatic fallout and other
associated costs. Overall, the expected costs of filing suit seem likely to outweigh
the expected benefits.

1. A successful suit could result in profit recovery, economic growth,
energy savings, and natural resource preservation.
For the U.S., the environmental and economic benefits of China eliminating
its restrictions go hand in hand. Numerous U.S. recyclables processing operations
have had to either store their sorted recyclable materials on site or consider
landfilling the materials. 184 Storing the materials means that the materials are not
being reincorporated into new materials, and landfilling the materials not only
means the sorted recyclables are not being incorporated into new materials, but
also that they are taking up landfill space that might be better used for material
that cannot be reused. 185 Ultimately, this means that raw materials are used where
recycled materials could be used instead. It also means that more landfills start to
hit their capacity sooner (requiring more landfills to be created). In some instances,

183

184
185

China has previously failed to comply with the terms of a dispute resolution. See, for example, Report
of the Panel, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United
States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, supra note 129, at 125–26.
Brooks, supra note 13.
Livia Albeck-Ripka, Your Recycling Gets Recycled, Right? Maybe, or Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2018), http://perma.cc/4WPS-MK5Z.
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this also means resources are used unnecessarily to sort out recyclable materials
that get put into a landfill as a last resort. 186
Winning a WTO suit and compelling China to remove or change its
restrictions could mean that these recyclable materials could be sent to China and
reused. This would mean that the recyclables sorters would once again have a
market for their materials—likely leading to recovered profits. 187 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s Recycling Economic Information Report
found that in 2007, 1.57 jobs were created for every ton of material recycled. 188
The report also found that total recycling and reuse activities created 757,000 jobs,
$36.6 billion in wages, and $6.7 billion in tax revenue. 189
Eliminating China’s restrictions would also mean that the materials
themselves would not be landfilled and could replace some of the raw materials
being used in manufacturing—resulting in overall savings of natural resources and
energy. 190 Friends of the Earth, an international network of environmental
organizations, reports that recycled steel saves roughly seventy percent of
production energy, recycled aluminum saves seventy percent, and recycled paper
saves forty percent. 191 However, it is hard to speculate about what form the
changed restrictions might take, so it is not guaranteed that all of these benefits
would play out completely. Additionally, this would simply allow the recycling
industry to continue to rely upon exporting waste when there could be long-term
benefits from building up recycling infrastructure within the U.S.

2. Diplomatic fallout and potential economic retaliation will likely
follow from a successful WTO suit.
As mentioned above, the U.S. and China are currently engaged in a trade
war, 192 which, if combined with a contentious WTO suit, is likely to worsen the
relationship between the two countries. The U.S. Trade Representative has written
that China’s protectionist policies were worse in 2017 than any of the preceding
five years. 193 By attempting to “punish” China via a WTO suit, it is less likely that
the U.S. would be able to foster diplomatic cooperation, and more likely that
China would further entrench itself against the U.S.
186

187
188
189
190
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When other countries have taken actions of which China disapproves, it has
been able to channel that anger to cause significant harm to the offending nation.
For example, in 2017, a Korean supermarket chain (Lotte) sold land to the South
Korean government so that the government could deploy Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) missiles on the site. 194 The Chinese government voiced
its disapproval of the South Korean government’s decision to deploy the
missiles. 195 Subsequently, Chinese consumers boycotted Lotte, causing it to sell all
of its stores in China. 196 The supermarket chain was subject to many store closures
over fire safety inspections (potentially due to heightened scrutiny by the Chinese
government). 197 Reports indicated that the Chinese state media encouraged the
consumer boycott. 198 Furthermore, there was a spike in cyberattacks originating
in China against South Korean targets following the deployment of the missiles. 199
China’s response to South Korea’s action was not a one-time event. For example,
it has also recently engaged in state media-sponsored targeting of Japanese
corporations in order to push consumers to buy domestic products. 200 Its “boycott
diplomacy” has been called devastating, with foreign companies largely helpless if
China becomes upset with the companies’ home nation. 201
In addition to fear of potential boycotts, China could withhold essential
regulatory decisions or use its ownership of U.S. debt to potentially harm the U.S.
economy. As an example of regulatory action, China was able to completely block
a merger between a U.S. company and a Dutch company by not granting
regulatory approval for the $44 million deal. 202 China’s ability to withhold
194
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regulatory decisions like this one could impose immense costs for U.S. businesses
and the U.S. economy generally. Furthermore, China could sell some of its
holdings of U.S. debt, causing the value of the dollar to decrease—which would
make borrowing more expensive for U.S. consumers and companies, potentially
slowing the U.S. economy. 203 A decrease in the value of the dollar would also make
imports into the U.S. more expensive for U.S. consumers, and exports from the
U.S. cheaper for foreign consumers. 204
All of the previously discussed potential actions would have severe impacts
for the U.S. economy and are potential avenues through which China could
respond if a successful U.S. suit pushes diplomatic tensions too far. It is hard to
predict what actions China would realistically take, but assigning even a small
probability to large-magnitude costs increases the expected cost of diplomatic
ramifications.

3. China may not fully comply with a WTO panel decision even if the
suit is successful.
China has previously not complied with the mandatory remedies for
implementing a WTO decision from a dispute it lost. In 2011, the U.S. filed a
complaint with the WTO regarding Chinese regulations on the import of “broiler
products.” 205 The U.S. argued that China’s imposition of the regulations was not
sufficiently transparent or factually justified as the WTO required such restrictions
to be. 206 After both countries had the opportunity to make their cases, the WTO
found that the Chinese regulations were in violation of the rules binding WTO
members and China agreed to bring its regulations into compliance. 207 However,
China’s attempts at revising the regulations were apparently unsatisfactory or
insufficient. The U.S. filed a complaint on June 2, 2016, arguing that China had
failed to follow the agreement and had not brought its regulations into
203

204

205

206
207

Bryan Boryzowski, China's $1.2 Trillion Weapon that Could be Used in a Trade War with the U.S., CNBC
(Apr. 5, 2018), http://perma.cc/SFX3-WB8G.
Bob McTeer, Is a Strong Dollar a Good Thing or a Bad Thing?, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2015),
http://perma.cc/SZ4H-7B5E.
Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures
on Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/1 G/L/960 (Sept. 23, 2011), supra note 129.
Id.
Report of the Panel, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the
United States, 166, WT/DS427/R (Aug. 2, 2013) (finding that China’s regulations violated WTO
requirements); Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty
Measures on Broiler Products from the United States, WT/DS427/5 (Sept. 30, 2013) (adopting the Panel
Report); China – Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the United States:
Agreement Under Article 23.1(B) of the DSU, WT/DS427/7 (Jan. 6, 2014), supra note 129 (stating that
the US and China have agreed to a schedule within which China will bring its regulations into
compliance).

Summer 2019

325

Chicago Journal of International Law

compliance. 208 It asked the WTO to convene a panel to determine whether China
had sufficiently revised its regulations. 209 On March 1, 2018, the panel found that
China had not complied with what it had agreed to do and the Dispute Settlement
Body adopted the panel report, compelling China to once again revise its
restrictions. 210
The dispute over broiler products shows that China will not necessarily
comply fully with an adverse WTO Panel decision, and that it might further
entrench its policies without engaging diplomatically. In the broiler products
dispute, the U.S. had to return to the WTO in an attempt to force China to
comply—meaning the U.S. was unable to get China to comply with the agreement
via diplomacy. In this case, China would be in a particularly good position to not
follow strictly the result of a WTO decision favorable to the U.S. Given the
environmental lens through which the restrictions have been implemented, China
could paint the U.S. as attempting to forcibly prevent China from pursuing better
environmental protections for its ecosystems and its people.

4. The U.S.’s decision to file a WTO suit could be seen as
environmental imperialism.
By entering into a WTO dispute with China over China’s recycling
restrictions, the U.S. would potentially engage in environmental imperialism.
Environmental scholars have identified two types of environmental imperialism
that regularly play out in the world. The first type is the imperialism of wealthy,
developed countries forcing their restrictive environmental protections on other
countries that are attempting to develop industry through potentially
environmentally harmful policy. 211 A stark example of this phenomenon is the
lobbying campaign by environmental groups attempting to stop the World Bank
from approving a loan for a coal-fired power station in South Africa. 212 The
second type is the imperialism of wealthy, developed countries sending their waste
208
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and dirty industries to developing countries. 213 For example, Guinea-Bissau was
offered $600 million to import fifteen million tons of industrial waste over five
years. 214 While the offer was economically extraordinary, its potential health
effects could have been disastrous. 215
China arguably encounters situations akin to both kinds of imperialism
regularly—though its position as a developed or developing country is the subject
of controversy. 216 In terms of waste exports, all of the evidence discussed up to
this point indicates that China has long accepted the recyclables that developed
countries export in disproportionate quantities. China has also accepted a
disproportionate share of other waste as well. In 2013, roughly seventy percent of
electronic waste ended up in China and was largely processed in a manner harmful
to human health and the local environment. 217 China has also run into issues where
environmental protection concerns from developed nations seem to prevent it
from economically developing.
Commentators have noted that China has repeatedly run into “green
barriers” in trade. “Green barriers” are environmental restrictions in other
countries that require a level of environmentally-friendly processing too high for
certain producers to meet. Here, Chinese goods made to lower environmental
standards cannot be imported into some countries because Chinese firms cannot
meet their high environmental standards. Yuhong Zhao, Associate Professor of
Law at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, writes that
[b]oth the business sector and many government officials fear that the
legitimate goals of protecting the health and safety of human beings, animals,
and plants could be used as a pretext for the introduction of protectionist
trade policies designed to slow down trade growth and cause economic
stagnation for China.” 218
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“green barriers.” 219 The restrictions that China has implemented on recycling
could potentially be seen as an attempt to do just that. 220
A successful WTO suit brought by the U.S. could be viewed as imperialistic
through the implication that the U.S. forcibly required China to accept the U.S.’s
waste irrespective of the cost to China’s environment. China, faced with “green
barriers” to the export of its goods, has adopted restrictions on recyclables
imports in order to clean up its environment and meet the higher environmental
standards of other countries to which it exports materials. This attempt at cleaning
up its environment has not been met with encouragement. Instead, there were
protests and letters from the E.U. and the U.S. to the WTO complaining about
rushed implementation of restrictions, potential trade unfairness, and waste
diversions that may harm the environment. 221 Rather than support China’s
attempt to clean up its environment, the U.S. would frustrate China’s move
towards environmental improvement and push the environmental costs of
processing U.S. waste onto China. It would be diplomatically unwise and
potentially unethical for the U.S. to use the WTO to force China to accept the
U.S.’s contaminated recyclables and waste.

D. Potential Ramifications of an Unsuccessful Suit
For the U.S., an unsuccessful suit would be a particularly bad result. First, as
with those from a successful suit, the diplomatic ramifications of an unsuccessful
suit could still be viewed as imperialistic and lead to a worse relationship between
the U.S. and China. Second, the negative environmental and economic effects of
China’s recycling restrictions (as laid out previously) would stay in place. Third,
the U.S. would also have sunk time and resources into attempting to win the suit
with no payoff. In fact, there is a possibility that the WTO Panel or Appellate
219
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Body may decide the case and create a precedent that might be particularly
harmful to U.S. interests in the future when faced with other import regulations
that restrict trade.

E. Potential Benefits of Not Filing Suit
The most obvious benefit of not filing suit is avoiding further diplomatic
tension with China. Although the U.S. is still involved in multiple trade disputes
with China at the WTO, one fewer suit is one fewer straw that could potentially
break the diplomatic camel’s back. This case would also be particularly likely to
increase tension because of the conflicting forces pulling in different directions.
China’s processes are labeled too dirty for countries to allow certain imported
materials while it is simultaneously being lobbied to allow still more potentially
polluting materials to come through its borders. China has ostensibly adopted the
restrictions to improve its environmental protections and chosen which of the
conflicting demands it would meet (in other words, chosen to overcome the green
barriers it faces). If the U.S. were to file suit and nullify that choice, it would likely
result in China taking out its understandable frustration through decreased
diplomacy.
Another potentially more impactful benefit over the long-term would be the
increased potential for the U.S. to more fully develop its recycling infrastructure.
The current oversupply of recyclable materials means that their prices are quite
low, so the start-up costs for new recycling facilities (facilities that take recyclable
materials and process them so they can be used as raw material inputs for
manufacturers) might be lower than they otherwise would be. 222 Chinese
corporations have already noticed this and have taken advantage of the trend by
opening plants in the U.S. U.S. corporations could join this trend. 223
Opening these new plants would be environmentally and economically
beneficial. The environmental benefits of recycling generally have already been
laid out. However, there are also added benefits to local recycling operations—
the decreased transit distances would mean less reliance upon transportation
infrastructure built largely around fossil fuel consumption. Less transportation
and use of fossil fuels means cleaner air and a decreased contribution to global
warming. Economically, the plants would create jobs for the communities in
which they are built and could lower the input costs for domestic manufacturers
seeking readily available raw materials. Furthermore, the plants could increase
222
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demand for the sorted materials coming from recycling sorting facilities currently
suffering from the Chinese restrictions and resultant lack of demand.
Finally, the moral aspect of not filing suit is also significant. Rather than
forcing China to accept waste it has actively tried to avoid, the U.S. would attempt
to solve the problem of its own waste internally. The U.S. has sent its
contaminated waste and its externalities across the sea without facing the true
costs of doing so. The Chinese government has previously rebuked the U.S. for
such actions, but the pattern of exporting waste has continued. 224 Importantly, the
problem is not that the U.S. is sending recyclable materials to China, but rather
that those shipments are frequently contaminated and China is forced to deal with
those contaminants. By not filing suit, the U.S. would avoid forcing China to
accept environmental harms.
Of course, there is the response that if the U.S. does not file suit and cannot
export its recyclables to China then, rather than processing it domestically, the
U.S. will ensure that some other nation will be stuck with the waste. Indeed, that
was the case for some time after the restrictions were put in place—Thailand and
Taiwan (among other nations) were inundated with the redirected flow of
recyclables. However, those nations have also begun to close their doors, and
other nations would likely follow suit. Although it is possible the U.S. would
simply keep shifting its recyclables exports to other countries, at some point it
would run out of options if the current trend continues. As a result, it is not certain
that the U.S. would truly act ethically after not filing suit against China for these
recyclables restrictions, but it is at least possible and it would potentially be
inevitable.

F. Not Filing Suit is the Better Choice for the U.S.
Although the potential economic and environmental benefits from filing and
winning a WTO suit are significant, the morally questionable overtones of the suit,
the possibility that China fails to comply with the WTO decision, the negative
diplomatic outcomes, and the negative trade outcomes likely offset any benefits
from a successful suit. Additionally, the low probability but very negative potential
results of an unsuccessful suit (wasted resources, diplomatic fallout, unchanged
economic and environmental situation, and being morally compromised) make
filing suit an even more unattractive option. In contrast, the morally positive
outcome of not filing suit—combined with the avoided diplomatic costs, the
potential growth of national recycling infrastructure, and the saved costs of
resources spent in filing suit—seem to significantly outweigh the economic and
environmental costs of the U.S. not being able to send much of its recyclables to
224
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China. Choosing not to file suit––in spite of the negative consequences––is the
better choice.

V. C ONCLUSION
The issue of China’s increasing restrictions on recyclables imports is one that
has not gathered as much press outside of industry circles as the general trade war
with China, but it may have large environmental and economic consequences for
decades to come. China’s significant role in the global recycling trade has meant
that its restrictions have seriously disrupted the industry, and there has not yet
been a clear path forward as other countries have also closed their ports to
recyclables imports. As a WTO member, China is required to comply with the
GATT (among other obligations), and it is likely that these recyclables import
restrictions are in violation of the GATT. Under the existing WTO Appellate
Body case law, China is unlikely to be able to argue that its restrictions meet the
requirements of exception under Article XX(b), and thus it is possible that the
U.S. could force China to revise its restrictions by filing and winning a WTO suit.
However, given the serious diplomatic and moral ramifications of a
successful WTO suit, not filing suit would be more beneficial than filing suit.
Unfortunately, this means the U.S. must determine another way to deal with its
growing overstock of recyclable materials. There is no easy path forward outside
of the WTO for the U.S. to take as a nation, but individual waste processing
companies have the ability to begin building domestic infrastructure—and the
U.S. government or local governments could potentially provide the funds to do
so.

Summer 2019

331

